This paper introduces a general model of matching that includes evolving public Bayesian reputations and stochastic production. Despite productive complementarity, assortative matching robustly fails for high discount factors, unlike in (Becker 1973) . This failure holds around the highest (lowest) reputation agents for 'high skill' ('low skill') technologies.
Introduction
Consider a static Walrasian pairwise matching economy where output depends solely on exogenous abilities. Becker (1973) showed that positive assortative matching (PAM) arises when abilities are productive complements. This is the foundational paper in the noncooperative theory of decentralized matching markets, and has established PAM as the benchmark allocation in the matching literature. Shimer and Smith (2000) and Atakan (2006) have since found complementarity conditions under which PAM still obtains in this fixed type framework with random matching and search frictions.
In a static world, productively complementary individuals assortatively match by their expected abilities. We introduce and explore a recursively solvable continuum agent matching model where agents have slowly evolving characteristics. In this dynamic model we prove existence of a steady state equilibrium and the welfare theorems quite generally.
We then specialize to a world where all abilities are simply 'high' or 'low'. We assume unobserved abilities, and stochastic but publicly observable output, where the separate contributions to joint production are unseen. Everyone is then summarized by the public posterior chance that he is 'high' -namely, his reputation is his characteristic. Within this general learning framework we consider two specific models.
We focus on the partnership model, in which workers with unobserved abilities are matched in pairs to produce output. In the employment model, these workers are matched one-to-one with jobs whose characteristics are known.
The partnership model can be interpreted literally as a model of production partnerships, or as a parable for production in teams within-firms, or finally as a model of within firm task assignment. Output in many organizations is largely produced by teams: academic co-authoring, movie production, advertising, the legal profession, consulting, or team sports. The O-Ring example of Kremer (1993) illustrates the role of stochastic joint production in high-tech industrial production.
The Partnership Model. Our analysis of the partnership model begins with a two period setting. Becker's result yields PAM in the final period. This yields a fixed convex continuation value function. We then deduce that the fixed expected continuation values are strictly convex in the reputation of one's partner. We show that this induces strict gains from rematching any assortatively matched interior agents with 0 or 1 (i.e. surely low or surely high individuals), or both, opposing production complementarity.
Despite this informational gain to non-assortative matching, PAM will again obtain in the first period with sufficient weight on the current period. However, since the static production losses from non-assortative matching in the first period are bounded, PAM cannot be optimal with sufficient weight on the future (Proposition 1).
Finite horizon models can have drastically different predictions than their infinite horizon counterparts. Is our two period analysis representative of the general setting?
While our findings hang in the balance, we rescue a failure of PAM that turns on a trade-off between value convexity due to learning and static input complementarity.
To see where our earlier logic goes wrong, we observe that the two period analysis critically relies on fixed continuation values. With an infinite horizon, the continuation value is endogenous to the discount factor, and in a troubling fashion: As is well known, it 'flattens out' with rising patience. So as the discount factor rises to 1, current production and information acquired in a match both become vanishingly important.
A flattening value function is well understood, but we find a more subtle change.
While it is true that the value function becomes less convex for any fixed reputation, it becomes more convex in a neighborhood of the extremes 0 and 1; thus, we are led once again to check whether PAM fails near these extremes. Our analysis requires a very precise characterization of the extremal behavior of the value function to resolve the knife-edged tradeoff between information and productive efficiency as patience rises.
The paper then turns to a labor economics story. Call the technology high skill if matches with one or two 'low' agents are statistically similar. For example, the production function in Kremer (1993) (in which project success requires success in all subtasks) is a high skill technology. Proposition 2 shows that efficient matching depends on the skill-revealing nature of the technology: PAM fails for high (low) reputations when production is sufficiently high (low) skill. Not all technologies are high or low skill. The information effect may reinforce the static output effect near 0 and 1, yielding PAM for any level of patience. In general, the PAM failure is quite robust. Proposition 3 shows for randomly chosen production technologies, the chance of both a high and low skill technology tends to one, as the number of production outcomes grows. We also offer simulation evidence that these conditions are extremely likely to hold in practice with few production outcomes.
Unlike other matching models with fixed types, ours affords an economically compelling micro-story as well. While the market is in steady-state, individuals proceed through their life-cycle, and their reputations randomly change, converging towards the underlying true abilities. So, with enough patience, if two genuinely high abilities are paired, then we should expect their reputations to rise as time passes. Eventually, they enter the region where PAM fails, and the partnership will dissolve.
Employment Model. Here, we specialize our model to one where workers are matched to jobs whose types are known. Workers still have unknown abilities revealed over time via stochastic production outcomes. We assume that workers' and firms'types are productive complements, and so ideally should assort. But with incomplete information, a worker's job assignment determines both his expected output and the quality of information revealed in production. We then arrive at a much different PAM result: Workers near the reputational extremes will always match assortatively (Proposition 5), since the productive effects there are strongest. This difference is the key empirical distinction between the partnership and employment models.
A Parsimonious Model for Labor Economics. Our partnership and employment models together provide a single coherent framework for understanding a variety of stylized facts in labor economics.
1. Wages drift up. Wages generally rise with work experience. Our model delivers this prediction, since expected values rise over time by Corollary 2, and so on average wages rise. But also consistent with the reality, wages sometimes fall from period-to-period. Both facts are true of our partnership and employment models.
2. Job Tenure, Mobility and Wages. Wages rise with job tenure, separation rates fall with job tenure, and high current wages are correlated with low subsequent mobility (see Jovanovic (1979) and Moscarini (2005) ). Just as in MacDonald (1982) , our employment model with discrete known jobs matches these stylized facts. To see why, note that workers at the reputational extremes are assortatively matched. Since a worker's wage equals his expected output, these workers receive the highest wages.
Finally, over time worker's reputations are pushed to the extremes as their true types are revealed. Thus, the longer a worker is with the same firm, the closer its reputation will be to the extremes and the higher its wage. Finally, the closer a workers reputation to the extremes, the longer until its type crosses an interior threshold for job changing.
3. Life Cycle Marginal Products versus Wages. Several empirical studies (eg. Medoff and Abraham (1980), Hutchens (1987) , and Kotlikoff and Gokhale (1992)) have found evidence for an increasing relationship between wages and productivity over the life cycle: young workers earn less than their marginal product and old workers more. In our partnership model, workers at the reputational extremes are paid an informational premium, and others sacrifice for type revelation. But if we follow a cohort of workers over time, their reputations move toward the extremes as their types are revealed. So on average, younger workers will see their wages lag their productivity, while the reverse holds for older workers. Observe how this result in our partnership model is entwined with our PAM failure. With assortative matching, the two partners each receive half the output in wages, and there is no wage productivity gap. Cohort. Huggett, Ventura, and Yaron (2006) finds that earnings dispersion across individuals within a cohort increases with age. This is consistent with both our partnership and employment models. Agents who have been around longer should have more accurate reputations than those at the beginning of their careers, and thus their reputations are more dispersed.
Wage Dispersion by
Related Work. PAM fails in Kremer and Maskin's (1996) complete information matching model -but so does productive complementarity. In Serfes (2005) and Wright (2004) , negative assortative matching arises in a principal-agent framework.
There is a small literature of equilibrium matching with incomplete information. Jovanovic (1979) considers a model where slow revelation of information about worker abilities causes turnover. Niederle and Roth (2004) '. MacDonald (1982) also considers matching with incomplete information. But in his model, the information revelation is invariant to the match. Unlike these papers, we show that Becker's finding robustly unravels given an informational friction that depends on match assignment.
Our model is also related to the learning paper by Easley and Kiefer (1988) , who ask when the decision maker eventually learns the true state. Incomplete learning requires that a myopically optimal action be uninformative at some belief. Easley and Kiefer show that no such action is dynamically optimal for a patient enough decision maker. Here, the statically optimal action (PAM) is not chosen given sufficient patience. Bergemann and Välimäki (1996) and Felli and Harris (1996) are related in that an element of the static price is information value, as with our wages.
Paper Outline. In Section 2, we set up our general model, define a Pareto optimum and competitive equilibrium, and establish the welfare theorems and existence. Our theory thereby applies both to the efficient and equilibrium analyses; however, our interest in the planner's problem is for the information it provides us about individual agents, since the planner's multipliers are precisely the agents' private present values of wages. In Section 3, we develop Becker's model for workers with uncertain abilities, explore the tradeoff between static complementarity and dynamic information gathering, and prove our PAM failure result. In Section 4, we analyze the employment model.
A technical appendix follows.
The Matching Economy

The Static Matching Model
We consider a matching model with a continuum of agents, each described by a scalar human capital x belonging to [0, 1] . Let Q(x, y) denote the static output of the match of types x and y. We assume that Q(x, y) is symmetric, twice smooth, increasing in x and y, with a nonzero cross partial, lest matching trivialize. As we assume everyone is risk neutral, Q can be either a deterministic output function or the expected output from stochastic production.
A twice differentiable function Q is strictly supermodular iff Q 12 > 0, and strictly submodular when Q 12 < 0. Although we do not require any special assumptions on Q for our existence and welfare theorems, the following assumption is used in some characterization results.
Assume a distribution G over human capital x ∈ [0, 1] . The social planner maximizes the expected value of output. For now, let F (x, y) be the measure of matches inside [0, x] × [0, y] . As the planner cannot match more of any type than available, he solves:
The matching set is the support of F (x, y). Positive assortative matching (PAM) obtains if the matching set coincides with the 45
Negative assortative matching (NAM) obtains when every reputation x matches only with the opposite reputation y(x) solving G(y(x)) = 1 − G(x). Then:
1 Proposition 0 (Becker (1973) ) Given supermodularity, PAM solves the planner's static maximization problem.
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NAM is efficient given submodularity.
In a competitive equilibrium, each worker x chooses the partner y that maximizes his (expected) wage w(x|y), achieving his value v(x). Also, wages of matched workers exhaust output, and the market clears. Altogether, a competitive equilibrium (CE) is a triple (F, v, w) where F obeys the feasibility constraint (2), while F, v, w satisfy:
• Value Maximization: v(x) = max y w(x|y).
• Output Shares:
Becker proved the welfare theorems which Theorem 2 revisits in a dynamic setting. 
Dynamically Evolving Human Capital
We now develop our model in a stationary infinite horizon context over periods 0, 1, 2, . . .. 
Crucially
Towards a nondegenerate steady state, we assume that agents live to the next period with survival chance σ, and to maintain a constant mass 1 of agents, posit a 1 − σ inflow cdfḠ. To properly align incentives, we assume that the agents' implicit rate of time preference equals the planner's discount factor γ < 1 scaled by the survival chance, namely δ ≡ σγ. To avoid trivialities,Ḡ does not place all weight on 0 and 1.
Given an initial type cdf G, the planner chooses the matching cdf F in each period to maximize the average present value of output, respecting feasibility. Let Φ(G) be the feasibility set in (2). For any F ∈ Φ(G), define the policy operator
Here, (1 − σ)Ḡ + σB(F ) is next period's type distribution. Thus, the planner solves for the Bellman value V, namely a fixed point of the operator
The planner trades off more output today for a more profitable measure over types tomorrow. This trade-off lies at the heart of our paper. A steady state Pareto optimum (PO) is a triple (G, F, v) such that (F, v) solves the planner's problem given G, and G = (1−σ)Ḡ+σB(F ). Just as in the analysis of the modified golden rule in growth models, the social planner does not maximize across steady states. Instead, she chooses an optimal matching in each period, after which steady state is imposed. While our results obtain both in and out of steady state, we focus on the steady state for simplicity.
Existence and Welfare Analysis
Theorem 1 (Pareto optimum) A steady state Pareto optimum exists.
The appendix proves this. The first order conditions (FOC) for this problem are:
where v(x) is the multiplier on the constraint (2) In a competitive equilibrium (CE), let w(x|y) be the wage that agent x earns if matched with y. Anticipating a welfare theorem to come, we overuse notation, letting v(x) denote the maximum discounted sum of wages that x can earn -the private value.
A steady state CE is a 4-tuple (G, F, v, w) ,
, wages w(x|y) are output shares (3), dynamic maximization obtains:
and finally y is a maximizer of (7) whenever (x, y) ∈ supp(F ).
Theorem 2 (Welfare Theorems) If (G, F, v, w) is a steady state CE, then (G, F, v) is a steady state PO. Conversely, if (G, F, v) is a steady state PO, then (G, F, v, w 
See how we assert that the planner's shadow values and the private values coincide.
These welfare theorems are greatly complicated by the evolution of types. Fortunately, continuation values are linear, and therefore convex, in measures of matched agents.
The competitive wage has two components. First is the static wage, or the difference between match output and one's partner's outside option. Second is the dynamic rent, or the discounted excess of one's partner's continuation value over his outside option.
That the dynamic benefits are publicly observed sustains the welfare theorems, since they can be compensated. For instance, in our Bayesian model the public reputations serve as the types. Here, dynamic rents will be positive by convexity even when identical agents match, and reputations near 0 and 1 will earn greater dynamic rents.
For some insight into why this wage decentralizes the Pareto optimum, consider a pair (x, y) matched in equilibrium. Worker maximization (7) requires that v(x) equal
using our computed wage (8). With some simplification, we get: Proof of (a): V Strictly Rises in Mean Preserving Spreads. Let's consider monotonicity of the planner's value V in mean preserving spreads:
wheneverĜ is a mean preserving spread of G.
We prove below that if V obeys P, then T V obeys P, and because P is closed under the sup norm, the fixed point V = T V obeys P. In fact, we prove that T V obeys the stronger property P + , where strict inequality obtains, so that V strictly rises in MPS.
LetĜ be a MPS of G (the premise of P).
xdζ(x) = 0, and ζ does not almost surely vanish. Let F ∈ Φ(G) be optimal for G,
insofar as it places all weight not common to G andĜ along the diagonal. SinceĜ is a MPS of G, and Q(x, x) is everywhere convex, being bilinear and strictly supermodular:
For the same reason, and since B(F ) is a linear operator, we have
Changing the order of integration:
which is non-negative because
Proof of (b): Convexity of the Shadow Value. For any x in the support of G, equally spread a small fraction ε of the G distribution near x to x ± h, where h > 0 is feasible and arbitrary. The slope of 
τ (s|x, y)ds is bi-convex, the continuation distribution incurs a MPS, and continuation values weakly rise. As F is symmetric, so is Ψ v , and the slope
, which must be non-negative. Altogether, Ψ v is convex in x, and likewise y.
Since the shadow value is everywhere convex, it is less than its continuation.
Corollary 2 (Dynamic Rents) Dynamic rents for interior types are positive, or 
As a maximum of linear (and so weakly supermodular) functions, it is supermodular.
3 Reputation in a Partnership Model
Static Production and Reputations
We now specialize to a matching model where each agent can either be 'high' (H) 
Each of a continuum [0, 1] of individuals has a publicly observed chance x ∈ [0, 1] that his ability is H. Call x his reputation. So a match between agents with reputations x and y yields output q i ≥ 0 (i = 1, . . . , N ) with probability
The expected output of this match is
Since q i > 0 for all i, we have Q(x, y) > 0 and matching is always optimal. As our production function Q is bilinear, we define the constant
Thus, Assumption 1 simplifies to π > 0. Here, π is the premium to pairing {H, H} and {L, L} rather than matching {L, H}.
Since output is SPM, Proposition 0 implies that PAM obtains in a static matching model. Then we have v(x) = Q(x, x)/2, which is strictly convex, as Q is bi-linear and supermodular:
This convexity is crucially exploited in the last period of the two period model below.
Two Reinterpretations. One may reinterpret this as a a model of within-firm team assignment with unknown worker types. If pairs of workers perform tasks and the firm maximizes the present value of its output, then it solves our Planner's Problem.
We can also dispense with the assumption that tasks must be performed by groups of workers, but assume workers are employed. We perform this transformation in §4.
Matching in a Two Period Model
To build intuition for our infinite horizon results, consider a stylized two period model with payoffs weighted by 1 − δ ∈ [0, 1) and δ. While δ < 1/2 in a truly two period model with strict time preference, δ > 1/2 obtains if period 2 means "the future" in an infinite horizon model. Thus, δ → 1 captures increasing patience. The value function varies with the discount factor in the infinite horizon model. But with two periods, we can exploit the strict convexity of the final fixed value function. This dodges a hard complication, allowing us to prove a strong impossibility result.
Bayesian Updating and Continuation Values. In a dynamic model, agents x
and y produce publicly observed output q i when matched; their reputations are then updated by Bayes rule. Agent x's posterior reputation is 
PAM Failure in the Two Period Model. We now deduce an unqualified failure of PAM unique to this setting which cleanly captures the opposition between the value convexity and production supermodularity. This requirement cannot be met.
Proposition 1 Fix x ∈ (0, 1). Given matches (0, 0) , (x, x) , and (1, 1), the expected total continuation value is strictly raised by rematching x with either 0 or 1.
. So matching the unknown agent x with either of the known abilities 0 or 1 is dynamically more profitable than assigning him to another x. Since agents 0 and 1 have the same posterior reputation regardless of partner, this implies that either:
Assume PAM in period zero. Re-match as many of the reputations x ∈ (0, 1) with 0 or 1 as possible (the choice governed by Proposition 1). The informational gains of this rematching are strictly positive, and swamp the production losses, for large δ.
Corollary 3 In the two period model, PAM is not an equilibrium for large δ < 1.
One might venture that extreme agents 0 and 1 are informationally valuable because all match output variance owes to the uncertain ability of the middle type x. But our argument shows only that at least one extreme agent must be informationally valuable: they both need not be. In the numerical example below, the dynamic effect reinforces the static output effect near one extreme and conflicts near the other.
Illustrative Example of Assortative Matching Failure. We consider an example technology reminiscent of the O-Ring failure in Kremer (1993) . Assume that production requires two high abilities, in which case output is produced with chance 1/2. Specifically, assume (q 1 , q 2 ) = (0, 4), h = (1/2, 1/2), and m = = (1, 0). This yields supermodular output, since π = H + L − 2M = 2. A matched pair (x, y) produces output 4 with chance xy/2. Reputation x updates to z 1 (x, y) = (2 − y)x/(2 − xy) after output q 1 = 0, and to z 2 (x, y) = 1 after output q 2 = 4.
Given PAM in period two, the value of reputation x at the start of the second
The present value of the match
To illustrate Proposition 1, consider the reputation x = 1/2. Since m = there is no informational advantage to matching any x ∈ (0, 1) with x = 0. But if x assortatively matches, this is dynamically valuable -it may well be a {H, H} match. Here is an intuition for the shape of the matching set G in Figure 2 . By local optimality considerations, G is decreasing whenever the match valuev(x, y) is submodular (shaded region). Next, it cannot exit the supermodular region on a downward slope. 
On the right, we plot the equilibrium wage function w(x) ≡ w(x|y(x)) (solid line). Given the high discount rate δ = 0.99, the wage w(x|y(x)) is almost entirely an information rent ψ v (y(x)|x)−v(y(x)) -whose discontinuity forces a jump in the wage profile. We superimpose the surplus in optimal values over assortative values. The solution was produced by linear programming with a discrete mesh on [0, 1] .
Third, by the uniform density on reputations, G has slope ±1 whenever continuous. 
Infinite Horizon Matching by Reputation
In principle, to update the reputations of individuals after any match one can exploit information about the outcomes of the current matches involving their past partners.
This would render our model both intractable and unrealistic, since it would entail complicated output sharing arrangements, involving transfers between past partners.
At the same time, we do not want completely anonymous individuals, for that would limit our empirical applications. We adopt a simple compromise: With this assumption, reputation is a sufficient statistic for the information from all previous matches, and yet we may still speak of partnerships in a meaningful sense.
Value Convexity The convexity of the value function in beliefs for a single agent learning problem is well known (see Easley and Kiefer (1988) ). Although Theorem 3(b)
is new, it admits the standard intuition that information is valuable -only here, its value is to the planner. Why? Suppose that a signal is revealed about the true ability of an agent with reputation x. This resulting random reputation has mean x (so a 'fair' gamble). The signal also cannot harm the planner -for she could choose to ignore it. Recall that a decision maker is averse to all fair income gambles iff his utility function is concave. Inverting this logic, the value function is strictly convex since the information is strictly beneficial. For the planner is not indifferent across matches Productive versus Informational Efficiency Our two period result obtains because the continuation value function is fixed, given PAM in the final period (by Becker);
further, it is boundedly and strictly convex. Thus, PAM fails with sufficient patience, given our either-or inequality in Proposition 1.
But with no last period, the continuation value function depends on the discount factor in a way that undermines the two period logic of Proposition 1: For as the discount factor δ rises, the value function v δ flattens out in the limit -hereby indicating the dependence on the discount factor δ. Not only do the static losses from PAM vanish, but so too do the dynamic gains. We may then have been misled: An infinite horizon model is needed to resolve this race to perfect patience.
A matching is productively efficient if it yields the highest current output. It is dynamically efficient if no other matching yields a greater continuation output. A necessary condition for either efficiency notion is that no marginal matching change can raise output today or in the future. Suppose we shift from assortatively matching Static Production Losses
For PAM to be efficient, this weighted sum must be positive. But our tradeoff is knife-edged in the limit: Both the static losses from not matching assortatively and the dynamic gains vanish as δ → 1, as the value converges upon a linear function: 0) . Thus, the cross partial Ψ δ 12 vanishes in the limit δ → 1. Actually the asymptotic behavior of the value function is more complex than this logic suggests. While the second derivative v δ (x) at any interior x tends to zero, the integral 1 0 v δ (x)dx is constant in δ. Perforce, v δ (x) explodes near the extremes 0 and 1 (as in Figure 3 ). This suggests that we should try to prove our PAM failure near the extremes.
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There are three logically separate steps that we must take to prove our main result.
• Lemma 1 finds when dynamic and productive efficiency conflict near 0 and 1.
• Proposition 2 finds when dynamic efficiency dominates for large δ.
• Proposition 3 shows that this domination generally occurs for large δ, as N ↑ ∞.
The Sign of the Information Effect Assuming PAM. Determining the optimal value function in general is an intractable problem. So instead, we derive the PAM value function and then show that PAM is not optimal for the induced value function v δ (x), by applying a new finding in Anderson (2007) that if a fixed policy generates a convex static payoff, then the second derivative of the value function explodes at a geometric rate near extremes 0 and 1. Specifically, Claim 5(a) in Appendix B.1 proves that the PAM value function satisfies:
when δ < 1 large enough.
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We next find when dynamic and productive efficiency conflict near x = 0 or 1. This fully exploits (10), and not only the explosive nature.
We now introduce an asymmetric correlation function for three vectors a, b, c. Let:
We know of no precedent for this expression. Proof Sketch: Claim 6 in Appendix B.1 uses our approximation (10) to prove that the expected continuation value has cross partial Ψ 
{L, L} matches, but the latter two cannot be so nuanced. In the extreme case, m = , it takes two 'high' agents for stochastically better production; when at least one agent is low ability, the ability of the other agent is irrelevant. With this observation, let's call this a perfectly high skill technology. By the same token, h = m yields a perfectly low skill technology. 
Proof: Since both terms in (9) vanish, we divide by −(1 − δ), and take the limit:
using l'Hôpital's rule to get lim δ→1 R(α δ )/(1−δ) = R (1)α 1 , and then R (1) = S(h, m, ) (10), givenα 1 = ∂α δ /∂δ evaluated at δ = 1. If the limit (12) is negative, then PAM fails near x = 0. The same expression arises for x near 1 with the analogs κ δ , α δ , and S( , m, h). The sum of (12) and its analog near given (11) . Is this inequality true? Integrating approximation (10),
for small x ≈ 0. As δ → 1, v δ becomes linear, while v δ (x) converges to a constant for any x ∈ (0, 1). That is, v δ (x) → v δ (1 − x) as δ ↑ 1 for any x ∈ (0, 1). This leads to: PAM Fails for 'Almost All' Production Technologies. We have given sufficient conditions for non-assortative matching at the extremes, and yet we claimed an almost general failure of PAM. How can we justify our assertion? For indeed, with fixed N , the inequalities (11) are not always satisfied, and therefore PAM may well obtain for both high and low reputations. Here is a simple parameterized example of this phenomenon:
2 ), where
, 1). For this technology, we have S(h, m, ) = S( , m, h) ≈
(constant) + log(ε)/2 < 0 for small ε. For this example, PAM is optimal even for high δ in the infinite horizon model.
We now assert that this example, while robust for fixed N = 3, is vanishingly rare when the number N of production outcomes grows: . This value function is convex and further v is unbounded near x = 0; however, v lies just outside the geometric family (10), and in fact, Proposition 3 fails.
Long Run Match Dynamics. Our focus until now has been on a failure of PAM in the large -on the distribution of matches in an economy. Our model also admits a rich unfolding micro story: agents are born and then form and dissolve partnerships as their reputations evolve over time. We finally focus our lens on this subplot with turnover, and the breakup of seemingly successful partnerships. Let's turn to the limit behavior of an individual's reputation.
First we ensure that ensures that no agent ever gets stuck at any reputation.
Assumption 2 It is not true that
This housekeeping condition follows from setting z i (x, y) ≡ x, and is generically valid. In case (b), the market's ability to learn an agent's ability is frustrated by its lack of knowledge of his partner's type. The applicable 'match state space' here is really
Also, its failure yields
L − M = y(H − 2M + L) > 0,
{{H, H}, {L, L}, {H, L}, and {L, H}}. Since production is symmetric, state {H, L}
is indistinguishable from {L, H}. Thus, if matches are permanent we may end up with
-that is, it may be clear from observing the (infinite) past output realizations that one person in the match is high and one low, but given that only joint output is observable, there is no way to tell which is which. Now that we know how individual agents' reputations behave in the long run, we can discuss the micro structure of match dynamics.
Corollary 4 Assume δ high enough, then any match of two high (low) agents eventually breaks up with chance tending to 1 as N → ∞.
Convergence to (1/2, 1/2) obtains for a long-lived match {H, L}. The limit is (1, 1) for {H, H} and (0, 0) We assume the same conditional output distributions as in the partnership model, illustrated in Figure 1 . We maintain that these distributions are non-degenerate:
and that matching like types yields strictly higher expected output than
For the market equilibrium, we assume free entry of jobs at zero cost. Thus, in equilibrium workers are paid their marginal products in their jobs. Since job creation is costless, the Planner maximizes the discounted value of production for each worker, just as each worker would do in the decentralized market. Thus, the welfare theorems again obtain, and further, the assignment problem can be solved worker by worker as a single agent dynamic learning problem.
Comparison of Results
The Two Period Model. We first consider a two period version. In the final period, the assignment solution will be degenerate if output monotonically increases in types:
In this case all workers will be employed by H type jobs. To avoid this trivial solution to the static problem, we assume for the purposes of this benchmark model (as in Roy and MacDonald) that: min{H, L} > M , as a result both types of jobs will employ workers in period 2. In the final period we get Roy's solution: a threshold reputationx = (L − M )/π < 1, such that all workers with reputation belowx match with job type L and all workers with reputation abovex match with job type H. In this equilibrium the value to a reputation x worker in period 2 is:
Now consider the first period. Conditional on matching with a type H job, a reputation x worker updates to z i (x, 1) with chance p i (x, 1). Alternatively x can match with a type L and update to z i (x, 0) with chance p i (x, 0). As mentioned, MacDonald (1982) studies the case of assigning workers of unknown types to known jobs when signals of worker productivity are uncorrelated with task assignment. In our model signals are production outcomes, and we cannot simply assume that signals are exogenous to assignments. In fact, except for certain degenerate sets of parameters, assignments in period 1 will impact the distribution over worker reputations in period 2.
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The continuation value for a reputation x worker matched to a job of type H is x, 1) ), and similarly ψ v (x, 0) is the continuation value when matched to L. Then a reputation x worker will be assigned to job type H iff :
The left hand side is the weighted difference in the static expected payoff from matching the worker with job type H rather than L and linearly rises at rate π > 0. Since we have assumed bounded signals, the right side vanishes for all x near the extremes {0, 1}.
Thus, workers and jobs are matched assortatively at the extremes. Showing that assortative matching occurs near the extremes {0, 1} in an infinite horizon model is not as immediate for high δ. As in the partnership model we must carefully balance the static losses from not matching assortatively with the (potential) dynamic gains to see how this trade off plays out for high δ. We carry out this analysis near x = 0. The analysis near x = 1 is symmetric.
First we establish (in the Appendix) the analog to our earlier result on dynamic efficiency near the extremes in the partnership model (Lemma 1).
Lemma 2 There exists δ * < 1 such that for all δ > δ * , such that matching workers with reputations near x = 0 with the type L job maximizes continuation values iff:
In the partnership model, static and dynamic efficiency are generally at odds as the number of productive outcomes grow. In the discrete jobs case this is no longer true.
Indeed, inequality (14) and its converse are equally likely to obtain if parameters are drawn uniformly over the simplex for all N . Thus, the a.s. failure of PAM result that obtained in the partnership model, cannot obtain in this discrete jobs benchmark.
Nevertheless, we can still ask (as we did in the partnership model) whether dynamic efficiency dominates static efficiency for high δ. Or put another way: when inequality (14) is reversed, can we show that all x near 0 match with job type H for high enough δ? In the continuum case we showed PAM failed by considering an infinitesimal rematching at the extremes. Of course, in the discrete jobs model we cannot do such a marginal rematching. Instead our approach in the Appendix is to compare the static loss from matching with H rather than L to the dynamic gain from such a rematching for x near the extremes {0, 1}. It turns out that for all values of δ, the static loss of non assortative matching dominates any dynamic gain. Specifically:
Proposition 5 Assortative matching obtains for all reputations in an open interval around each extreme reputation at all discount rates.
Altogether, the partnership model that we have introduced radically differs from the analogous employment model. In the partnership model, failures of assortative matching robustly obtain at the extreme reputations and thus assortative matches eventually break up. Conversely, in the employment model, assortative matching fails for interior reputations, and all workers are assortatively matched in the long run.
Conclusion
We have developed a general dynamic matching model in which the characteristics of agents stochastically evolve depending on their chosen match partner. We have shown that a steady state competitive equilibrium exists and coincides with a competitive equilibrium in which agents choose their partner.
Within this general framework we have considered two applications in which the characteristics that evolve can be interpreted as reputations. In the partnership model, we found that contrary to Becker (1973) , production complementarity no longer implies global PAM. We instead find a conflict between productive and dynamic efficiency.
Given enough patience, PAM cannot arise in a stylized two period model, while PAM may well be dynamically efficient for high or low agents. We have argued, however, that it cannot globally be dynamically best when agents are patient enough: Either high or low reputation agents will match non-assortatively, not necessarily both. What matters is a new statistically-based condition on the production technology alone that is completely unrelated to supermodularity. Our proof also relies on a knife-edge tradeoff between dynamic and productive efficiency, as δ races up to 1.
In the employment model, we have shown that informational concerns dominate productive concerns for workers with reputations near some interior cutoff, while productive concerns dominate near extreme reputations. Thus, unlike in the partnership model, workers with extreme reputations will be assortatively matched in the employment model. This paper offers both theoretical and applied insights. First, we have developed a proof by counterfactual for the failure of PAM by exploiting the convexity of shadow values. Second, we have shown that our learning model provides a single coherent framework for understanding a host of time series and cross-sectional properties of the labor market, ranging from job tenure to wage growth. These properties can therefore be seen as owing to the factors identified here. Finally, we also identify a new phenomenon -the efficient break-ups of matched stars (like the Beatles)in industries with high skill technology -on which more empirical work is needed.
A Existence, Welfare Theorems, and Values
Here, we assume that the social planner chooses the measure over matches µ, where be the correspondence from distributions G ∈ Z into feasible matchings given (2):
Claim 1 [0, 1] 
is weak* closed, and thus Φ(G) is weak* closed. We show that this correspondence is upper and lower hemi-continuous (u.h.c. and l.h.c.) . Now Φ is pointwise closed, and we can assume without loss of generality that it maps into a compact subset of W * , say with upper bound M < ∞. Thus, u.h.c.
follows if Φ has the closed graph property -i.e. if for any
some A. The result follows from continuity of λ G (A) = I A× [0, 1] 
Recall that a correspondence Φ is l.h.c. 
We claim that there exists , η > 0 such that µ ∈ O∩Φ(Ĝ) for allĜ ∈ Z with Ĝ −G < η.
Pick any suchĜ. Easily, µ ∈ O for small > 0. We show that µ ∈ Φ(Ĝ) for any
Using the norm V = sup G ≤1 |V(G)| on value functions, define:
V is homogeneous of degree 1, continuous, and V < ∞} The planner's present value of output Claim 4 There exists a cdf G and a matching measure µ that is a steady-state PO.
Proof: Define the correspondence T *
where G ∈ Z. Let Θ : W * → Z be the function capturing the transition equation:
), then we can assume a constant optimal matching measure µ * ∈ Φ(G * ).
By an extension of the Kakutani Fixed Point Theorem in Istratescu (1981) , §10, it suffices that T *
• Θ be nonempty, convex-valued, closed-valued, and u.h.c. Claim 3 yields non-emptiness. Now, T * is u.h.c. and closed-valued by Robinson and Day (1974) . LetĜ be the density associated with the matchingF , and let ρ t (z, x, F ) be the chance that agent x at time 0 updates to z at time t. By worker maximization (7),
Integrate over x to get w, F ≥ w,F , contrary to w,F > w, F . Thus, F is a PO.
To prove that v is a multiplier in the planner's problem for the given (efficient) F , we show that (F, v) satisfies the planner's FOC. Take any matched pair (x, y). If we sum the worker maximization conditions (7) for x and y we obtain:
Since w(x|y) + w(y|x) = Q(x, y), the planner's FOC (6) is satisfied for this matched pair. Now take any (x, y) (not necessarily matched). Worker maximization (7) implies:
Summing these two inequalities and applying (3) yields: 
As this holds for any matched pairs, output shares w exist so that (F, v, w) is a CE.
B Non-Assortative Matching
B.1 Asymptotic Analysis for Lemma 1 and Proposition 2
We proceed by contradiction, assuming PAM and using the implied value function v δ . 
Part (a) provides a functional form for the second derivative near x = 0 at fixed δ.
Essentially, v geometrically blows up as fast as it can and still leave v integrable. Part (b) also follows from Anderson (2007) . Beyond the assumptions needed for part (a), the derivative of the policy function must be finite at x = 0, and |p iy (x, y)| < ∞. Since a(x) = x and p i (x, y) is linear, these assumptions are met.
where R(1) = 0 and R (1) = S(h, m, ).
Proof: Computing Ψ δ 12 (x, x) we have:
).
12
We can integrate our asymptotic approximation from Claim 5, written as v δ (x) =
, to yield expressions for v δ and v δ in (16). Making this substitution 11 We can translate to the Anderson (2007) framework by letting the action a(x) be the reputation of the agent to match with x, and h i y + m i (1 − y) and m i y + i (1 − y) be the probabilities of realizing signal q i given action y in the high and low state of the world, respectively.
), the terms in θ δ (x) are:
Thus,
We need to know that this term is negative and bounded away from zero as δ → 1. We have already shown that κ δ > 0 for δ < 1 (Claim 5 (a)). Thus, we need only show now that R(α) < 0 for large α < 1, since α 1 = 1 and α δ is increasing in δ near 1. Given R(1) = 0, we are done since R (1) > 0, for then θ δ (x) < 0 for δ near 1 and small x. Anderson (2007) proves that v δ exists and is continuous on [0, ε] , for some ε > 0. Differentiation yields:
B.2 Proof that PAM Implies
Similarly, v δ (1) = Q (1, 1)/2, and so
B.3 PAM Almost Always Fails: Proof of Proposition 3
As we have shown, PAM fails near
Thus, we need the measure of parameters (h, m, ) for which this inequality fails (the opposite weak inequality holds) to vanish as N increases.
We cannot apply a Law of Large Numbers, since the summands are dependent (eg. i h i = 1), and the domain (∆ N ) 3 changes in N . But if we can show that under a uniform distribution over parameters the probability that PAM fails converges to 1, then the measure of the parameters (h, m, ) for which PAM fails also converges to 1. Thus we assume that the probabilities h, m, are each uniformly distributed on ∆ N , i.e. the density ∆ N is (N − 1)! and has marginals (λ is Lebesgue measure)
Define the random variables, S N = S (h, m, ) and
We shall establish this in two steps:
Step 1: Together these assumptions yield some δ * < 1 such that the desired match contingent value approximations hold with α θ (δ) ∈ (1, 2) continuously falling in δ for all δ ∈ (δ * , 1) and α θ (1) = 1 by Lemma 2 and Proposition 1 in Anderson (2007) .
C.2 Extremal Ordering of Values for High δ
We have shown that when matching with firm type θ, the worker's value function is approximately linear plus x α θ (δ) near x = 0. Thus, for low enough x the value to matching with a type H job will be higher than matching with a type L job iff α H (δ) < α L (δ). Since we have α H (1) = α L (1) = 1 and α θ (δ) < 0, for δ close to 1:
By the Implicit Function Theorem: 
C.3 PAM Still Obtains at Extremes with High δ
We now show that the static effect dominates near x = 0 for δ arbitrarily close to 1.
Matching with job type H rather than job type L results in a static loss valued at:
which converges to 0 as δ → 1 and to a positive constant as x → 0 for any fixed δ < 1.
Given our asymptotic approximation, the dynamic change in value is approximately:
.
But since α θ (1) = 1, lim δ→1 ∆ψ(x, δ) = 0, static and dynamic effects vanish as δ → 1.
To determine the rate of convergence, we normalize the static and dynamic effect, 
